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STATE CONTROL OF CONSOLIDATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES
FoRD P. HALL t
One of the outstanding developments in the field of public utilities
during the past ten or fifteen years is the centralization of utility control.
The changes in ownership and control have been rapid and kaleidoscopic.
The value of unification to consumers cannot be disputed; provided, of
course, their interests are properly protected by public authorities. Un-
doubtedly the states have had it within their power to safeguard the inter-
ests of consumers; to guide concentrations along lines and into channels
which are beneficial to the public, without doing any injustice to utilities
which are rendering the services. As is too often the case, the legal and
political safeguards have lagged far behind the economic phenomena, and
have failed to protect adequately the public which has a very vital interest
in such proceedings.
This concentration of utilities is still continuing wherever there are
units which have escaped the omnivorous appetites of large corporations.
Unfortunately, in the case of some kinds of utilities, we are presented with
almost un fait accompli. In many cases commissions have either been
unable through lack of statutory authority, or unwilling to exercise in the
interests of the public such authority as they have had over consolidations,
sales, or stock transactions. The purpose of this study is to discover to
what extent states have attempted and are attempting to control this im-
portant development in the field of public utilities.
Despite the importance of the problem, there is a surprising dearth of
material.' There are a certain number of statutes, but it is astonishing to
note the number of states which have no statutory provisions on this subject.
There are numerous commission decisions, but almost no court cases. This
latter fact may indicate that the subject presents few legal questions. It
more probably signifies that, in general, utilities have received what they
have desired at the hands of administrative tribunals and have had no need
to proceed further by litigation.
In dealing with this subject, no attempt will be made to consider rail-
road consolidation, as that has been dealt with often and extensively by
other writers. No effort will be made to discuss the unification of street
- B. A. in Jurisprudence, 1925; B. C. L., 1926, Oxford University; LL. M., 1927, Uini-
versity of Minnesota. Associate Professor of Constitutional Law, and the Law of Public
Utilities in the Department of Political Science, Indiana University. Author of several arti-
cles on the Law of Public Utilities.
1One article on the subject is, Wherry, Principles Apfilicable to Consolidation and
Merger of Public Utilities (1929) 6 N. Y. U. L. Q. REv. i43-156. There is another article
by Fisher, Commission Regulation of Public Utility Merger and Consolidation in Connecti-
Cuit, JOURNAL OF LAND & PUBLIC UrILITY EcoNoiIIcs, Feb. 1932.
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railways as it is no longer of great significance. Nor will motor bus or
truck companies be discussed, as control over consolidation of such com-
panies is handled largely through control over the transfer of certificates of
convenience and necessity.
Questions of merger, consolidation, sale, and stock transfer are closely
related to questions of security issues. In fact, when permission is asked
to consummate one of the above transactions, there is usually an accompany-
ing petition to issue securities. Many states have statutory provisions re-
quiring consent of the public service commission before securities can be
issued. It has sometimes been asserted that such provisions clothe com-
missions with adequate power to protect the public in unification proceed-
ings. However, it is contended that they do not.
Such provisions do not cover outright sales and purchases for cash of
utility property or stock, or exchanges which do not involve the issuance
of securities. Nor do these statutory provisions pertaining to security issues
give the commission power to do more than prevent over-capitalization and
certain other financial abuses which may redound to the detriment of the
consuming public, whereas statutes which require that a merger, sale, con-
solidation, or stock transaction must be approved, give to commissions
much broader power to protect the public interest as to rates and services.
Although statutes pertaining to merger,, consolidation, sale and stock
transfers are designed in part to protect security holders against unscrupu-
lous financial juggling, the primary purpose is to safeguard the interests of
the public, by making more effective the control of commissions over rates
and services.
2
Few, indeed, are the decisions in which the constitutionality of these
statutes has been challenged. 'When the question has been raised, the courts
have uniformly upheld their validity. - In one case, it was held that a
statute which provided that no public utility should contract, purchase, con-
trol or lease the property, equipment, franchises or stock of any other public
utility without the consent of the commission did not violate the state con-
stitutional provision that the legislature should not pass. any local or special
law granting to any corporation or individual a special or exclusive privilege.
The court pointed out that the constitutional provision was not opposed to
the elimination of competition in all cases, but only where competition would
be eliminated' by conferring the right to exclude all others from engaging
in some business in the same field. In this case the company had no right
to exclude all others, since the state retained the power to exercise a super-
visory control in the matter.3
'See the statement of the court in Otter Tail Power Co. v. Clark, 59 N. D. 320, 229
N. W. 915 (930).
3State Public Utilities Comm. v. Romberg, 275 Ill. 432, 114 N. E. 1gI (1916), uphold-
ing the constitutionality of Ill. Laws i921, art. I, § 27, p. 703.
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In another decision it was held that a statute giving the commission
jurisdiction to determine whether the sale, conveyance or lease of the prop-
erty or franchise was consistent with public interest was a proper delegation
of legislative power, since although the legislature could not delegate legis-
lative power it could delegate the power to determine some fact or state of
things upon which the law made its own action depend.4
Common Law
What power to sell, lease, merge, consolidate or acquire stock do public
utilities have where there are no statutory provisions giving to commissions
the power to approve or disapprove such transactions? That such statutory
provisions have not merely codified the common law on the subject seems
obvious.'
If the property which a utility seeks to transfer is not being used or is
not useful in rendering its service to the public, the utility can like other
individuals or corporations alienate such property. However, if the prop-
erty is being used or is useful. the situation is different. Therefore where
a company holds a franchise, neither the franchise nor the property used in
performing its duties can be alienated under the rules of common law, if
by such transaction the utility is rendered incapable of performing ade-
quately its service.' At least this is true where a utility has been given the
power of eminent domain.- It can, however, transfer its property if it re-
ceives legislative permission.8
On the other hand, it appears that a public business such as a ware-
house which does not enjoy the power of eminent domain, or does not hold
a franchise, can sell, lease, or encumber its property without the consent of
the state.'
Merger, consolidation, or the purchase and holding of stock by cor-
porations present more obvious instances of transactions which cannot take
place without legislative consent. Inasmuch as corporations are creatures
4Ex parte City of Birmingham, i99 Ala. 9, 74 So. 51 (I917).
Alabama Public Service Comm. v. Louisville and N. R. Co., 2o6 Ala. 326 at 327, 89
So. 524 at 525 (1921). "... the act contemplates and authorizes inroads, to a limited extent,
upon the common law where the rule that a quasi public corporation may not, in the ab-
sence of statutory warrant, make any contract by which its power to perform its public
functions will be impaired; . . . but this rule of the common law did never prevent the
alienation of such property of a corporation as was not essential to the exercise of its du-
ties."
"See State e.x rel. v. Anderson, 97 Wis. 114, 72 N. W. 386 (1897); Attorney Gen.
v. Haverhill Gas Light Co., 215 Mass. 394, IOI N. E. io6i (1913); McCarter v. Vineland
Light & Power Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 703, 70 Atl. 177 (1908).
- Brunswick Gas Light Co. v. United Gas Fuel & Light Co., 85 Me. 532, 27 AtI. 525
(893).
' See the statement of the court in Weld v. Gas & Electric Light Commissioners, 197
Mass. 556 at 558, 84 N. E. iOl at iO2 (19o8). "Without legislative authority it cannot sell
its property and franchise to another party," in such a way as to take away its power to
perform its public duties; see also State ex rel. v. Anderson, supra note 6.
See Webster Mfgr. Co. v. Byrnes, el al., 207 Cal. 630, 28o Pac. loi (1929).
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of the state, they can do only that which the law designates. Consolidation,
merger, and stock purchases are not always sanctioned by the corporation
laws of a state. The New Jersey commission summarized the situation
well when it said:
"To merge and consolidate corporations there must be statutory au-
thority, otherwise no such authority exists." 10
One finds in the statutes of some states provisions giving to utilities
the right to lease or purchase property, or to consolidate without commission
consent. 1 In other states, they may merge, consolidate or acquire stock
to the same extent as other corporations.
Jurisdiction
About half of the states have statutes which require the consent of the
public service commission before utilities are permitted to merge or con-
solidate or dispose of their property, or acquire stock of other utilities.
This does not include states which have statutes governing such transac-
tions of railroads or street railways. There is as might be expected much
difference in the scope and extent of these statutory provisions. Some are
very limited, applying to certain transactions only, or applying to one kind
of utility only. Others are comprehensivie and require consent before any
public utility may inerge or consolidate with another, purchase, exchange
or hold the stock of another, sell, purchase, assign, lease or mortgage the
franchise property, assets or business of any other utility.
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Examination of these statutes reveals that about half of the states
have no provisions. expressly conferring upon commissions authority over
such transactions. The question naturally arises as to whether, in the ab-
sence of express provisions public service commissions have such jurisdic-
tion. The Colorado commission stated that it had no authority over the
purchase of the property of public utilities.1a And this declaration was
"In re Knickerbocker Ice Co., et al., P. U. R. I915F 5 at 7 (N. J.).
I"See for example. KAN. GEN. STAT. (1868) C. 23, § 77; KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. (1923)
§ 17-1905; N. M. Laws 1909, c. 141, § 5, and N. M. Laws 1912, c. 50, § I.
'-'Ala. Acts 1915, no. po5, p. 268, §§ I, 2, ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) 1766. Ariz. Laws
I9iz, c. 9o, § 51 (a). CAL. GEN. LAWS (Deering, 1923) Act 6386, § 51 (a) and (b).
CONN. GEN. STAT. (930) § 3616. Fla. Laws 1919, c. 7933, §§ 1-3. Ill. Laws 1921, art. III,
§§ 22, 27, p. 703. INn. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) §§ 12767-12768. CONST. OF Ky., § 20I.
See also Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1922) § 4679e-3. ME. REv. STAT. (1930) c. 62, § 44; c. 68, § 18.
Md. Laws I9IO, c. i8o, § 35. MASS. GEN. LAwS (1921) c. 164, §§ 26 and 96-r. Mic .
COMP. LAWS (1929) § 11707. MI-N. GEN. STAT. (1923) § 5306. Miss. CODE ANN. (1930)
§§ 7067-7068. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 5195. NED. CONST., art. X, § 3. N. H. PuB. LAWS
(1926) c. 240, §§ 28, 29, 31. N. J. Laws 1911, c. 195, § 18-ig. N. Y. PuB. SERV. Co.xr.
LAws (917) §§ 70, 83, 99 (2), I00. N. D. Con'. LAWS ANN. (Supp. 1925) § 4609 (c) 21-
22. OHIO ANN. CODE (Throckmorton, 193o) §§ 614-6o, 614-61,614-62. OKLA. COxST. art. IX,
§§ 8 and 9. Pa. Act of July 6, I913, P. L. 1374, att. V, § i8, and art. III, §§ 3 and 6.
Also Pa. Act of July 22, 1919, P. L. 1123; and Pa. Act of May 2o, 1921, P. L. 1949. S. D.
Laws 1921, c. 402. TEEN. ANN. CODE (Shannon, Supp. 1932) § 5452 (d). Vy. GEN. LAWS
(1917) § 4982; Vt. Acts 1931, no. ioi, §§ I and 3. WxIs. STAT. (1929) § 196.80.
'Re Public Service Co. of Colo., P. U. R. I928E 778 (Colo.).
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made in face of the express statutory authority of the commission to super-
vise generally and regulate every public utility, and to do all things whether
specified or not which are necessary or convenient in the exercise of this
power.1 The Oregon commission held that its approval was not required
for the sale of telephone exchange property when no withdrawal was in-
volved but merely the elimination of duplication." In contrast to this
holding, the Nebraska commission, in an early case, stated that it had juris-
diction to approve the consolidation of a telephone plant and the sale and
purchase of the telephone property of one company by another. It seemed
to think that such authority was derived either from its power to regulate
service or from its power to control generally such corporations.' 6 It is
difficult to see how such authority can consistently be implied from a statute
giving a commission power merely to require safe and adequate service;
but where a commission is given general power to supervise or control
utilities, the implication is logically not difficult.
Interesting questions have arisen concerning the scope and extent of
commissions' powers and jurisdiction under the various statutory provisions.
Even though a statute provides that no public utility shall merge, consolidate,
buy or sell stock or property without commission consent, certain stock
transfers do not fall under the supervisory authority of the commission.
For example, the commission may not control the acquisition by private
persons of the stock of public utilities.'" Such a literal interpretation makes
it possible to evade commission control very easily and effectively. A com-
plete and extensive control of utilities can be secured through the concen-
tration of stock ownership in the hands of individuals.
In general, these statutory provisions do not apply to stock transactions
of or with holding companies which do not engage in the actual operation
of utilities. Commissions are statutory bodies and have only such jurisdic-
tion as is specifically delegated by statute.' s Most utility statutes regulate
operating companies but make no mention of holding companies. Recently
there has been some tendency to confer this jurisdiction.' 9
The majority of these statutory provisions do not apply to the acquisi-
tion of stock or sale of stock to companies other than utilities. On this
point, however, the New York law is somewhat different. In addition to
providing that no gas or electric corporation shall acquire directly or in-
14 Colo. Laws 1921, § 2925.
'Re Union County Tel. Co., P. U. R. I92OC ioo2 (Ore.).
'Rc Lincoln Tel. & Tel. Co., P. U. R. I918C 802 (Neb.). This statement was made
before the adoption of the new Nebraska Constitution conferring jurisdiction under Art. X,
sec. 3.
'Borough of Brookville v. Solar Electric Co., P. U. R. i928B 621 (Pa.) ; Re High-
land Telephone Corp., P. U. R. 192IC 162 (Mich.); see also Re Cumberland County
Power & Light Co., P. U. R. 19i6D g9 (Me.).
' Re Madison Light & Power Co., P. U. R. 1924C 517 (Ind.).
"Wis. Laws 1931, c. 183, § 196.52; Kan. Laws 1931, C. 239, § 2(g).
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directly the stock or bonds of any other company in the same or similar
business, the statute provides that no stock company other than a gas or
electric company may acquire more than io per cent. of the capital stock of
these utilities except with the consent of the commission.20  This provision
which should give to the commission an effective authority over the cen-
tralization of utility control has, to a great extent, been rendered ineffective
by a court decision. A certain company had acquired 4,600 shares of com-
mon stock with unrestricted voting power, and 41,884 shares of preferred
stock of a utility.. Through the common stock, the holders had acquired
actual control of the affairs of the utility. The 4,6oo shares of common
stock had been transferred without the consent of the commission. Even
though the common stock gave actual control, the court held that the law
had not been violated as such stock constituted less than IO per cent. of the
total capital stock and the statute referred to the total capital stock issued,
and not the total capital voting stock.2' This decision, although literally
correct, has-made it easy for companies, by a bit of stock juggling, to evade
the provisions of this statute.
Since these statutes apply to consolidation or sale of public ittilities
they do not apply to transactions of corporations which have not commenced
operation or which have discontinued service, as such corporations cannot
be classed as utilities.
22
Whether both purchaser and seller must secure the consent of the
commission before making a transfer of stock or property depends largely
upon the wording of the statute. It has been declared in one case that the
North Dakota law does not require a company desiring to purchase a utility
plant to secure commission authorization.23 But even under the North
Dakota statute which specifically mentions the seller only, it has been held
that, on petition of the purchaser, the commission can consider whether or
not it is in the public interest to grant a petition to purchase the plant of a
utility, when to refuse jurisdiction would be using the statute as a cloak
for a fraud.24  If the statute requires approval for both purchase and sale,
as is the case in some states, commissions often have rules requiring all
IN. Y. PUBLIC SERVICE CoMMISSIox LAW (1917) § 7o-.
"New York State Elec. Corp.'v. Public Serv. Comm., z27 App. Div. IS, 236 N. Y.
Supp. 411 (i929), annulling the order of the public service commission in Re New York
Elec. Co., P. U. R. i923D 247 (N. Y.).
2'-Re Fairfield and Shawmut Ry. Co., P. U. R. I928D 385 (Me.). In this case there
was a petition to sell the property and franchises of a discontinued street railway to an-
other utility, but it was held that it was not under the jurisdiction of the commission for
it was not a public utility within the definition of that term under the statute.
Re New York-New Jersey Super Power Connecting Co., 215 App. Div. 578, 214 N. Y.
Supp. 294 (1926). In this case it was held that the petitioner was not an electrical corpo-
ration within the meaning of that term as used in the statute, as it did not own, operate
or manage an electric plant.
' Purchase v. Farmers Co-operative Milling Co., P. U. R. i92oF 9o6 (N. D.).
"Otter Tail Power Co. v. Clark, supra note 2.
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parties to the transaction to make joint application. 25 Even though a com-
mission has jurisdiction over both purchase and sale, there may be a differ-
ence in the extent of its jurisdiction over each. The Maryland Commission
has stated that its power to deal with purchasers of stock is much broader
than its power to deal with sellers. In the case of a purchaser, the commis-
sion is not bound to authorize the purchase unless it thinks the case calls
for its approval.
26
Another question which has frequently been raised involving jurisdic-
tion under these statutory provisions is that of the power of a commission
to order a purchase, sale or consolidation. Invariably it has been held that
such authority cannot be implied from the ordinary statutory provisions
requiring consent to sell, merge, consolidate, or acquire stock.27
As a general rule, the power of a public service commission does not
extend to matters which, though somewhat related to sale or consolidation,
are properly matters for the courts. Thus it was stated that the California
commission had no power to determine the question of the rights of a pur-
chaser or the validity of contracts. In New York, the commission held
that it was without power to order a dissolution of corporations already
consolidated or to decree a restitution of property legally transferred..
2 9
In some states, the commissions have jurisdiction over consolidations
and sales only when utilities are parallel or competing. This is the case
under the Nebraska constitutional provision which provides that utilities
are not to consolidate their stock, property, franchise or earnings with any
other utility owning parallel or competing property without the permission
of the commission.3 0 Following the mandate of this constitutional pro-
vision, the Nebraska commission decided that it had no jurisdiction over
the sale and purchase of public utilities which were not competing.31 Under
'See Rule V, Rules of Procedure of the California Commission; Rule XI Rules of
Practice of the Public Service Commission of New York; Rule X, Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Public Service Commission of Maryland; Rule XVI, Rules of Practice
and Procedure and Forms Governing Matters Before the Missouri Public Service Com-
mission.
'Re Central Public Service Corporation, P. U. R. 1930A 32 (Md.).
'The Nebraska Commission had no authority to order a physical consolidation of the
properties of two competing companies, Blackledge v. Farmers Independent Tel. Co., P. U.
R. I919D 211 (Xeb.).
The Arizona Commission had no power to compel one water company to purchase the
system of another, Re Arizona Corporation Commission. P. U. R. 19i9E 566 (Ariz.).
It was stated that the South Dakota Commission did not possess authority to require
consolidation of companies under one ownership notwithstanding the reasonableness and
desirability of such an arrangement, City of Grotan v. Grotan-Ferney Mutual Tel. Co.,
P. U. R. 1919E 894 (S. D.).
It was stated that the New York Commission was without power to compel the mer-
ger of utility companies, Re Ausable Forks Elec. Co., P. U. R. 192oB 79, (N. Y.).
The Oklahoma Commission was held to be without power to order the consolidation
of telephone exchanges, Whittenberg, et al. v. Taloga and Dewey County Telephone Co.,
P. U. R. 19i6C 104 (Okla.).
'Hanlon v. Eshelman, 169 Cal. 200, 146 Pac. 656 (915).
'Board of Trade v. Mountain Home Tel. Co., P. U. R. I9i6C 688 (N. Y.).
'CoNsT. OF NEB., art. X, §3.aRe Northwestern Bell Co., P. U. R. I927C 81 (Neb.).
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this same constitutional provision, two companies were held to be com-
petitors within its meaning where one was wholesale and the other retail
but both competed for municipal contracts.3 2 The Indiana statutes, which
are specific on this point, declare that utilities which parallel or intersect,
which are in the same locality, and which are giving the same kind of
service may merge with the consent of the commission.33  Despite this
exact statement, the Indiana commission took jurisdiction over an applica-
tion for consolidation by utilities, some of which were primarily traction
enterprises, while others were gas and electric; and where the entire group
was scattered over a large area in the state. 34 The logic of the commission
in assuming jurisdiction in this Indiana case was far from convincing.
The merger was disapproved. In a subsequent decision, however, a merger
of two of the same petitioners was approved, despite the fact that one of
the companies was engaged primarily in generating electricity, and the
other served customers largely at retail with electricity, gas, water, and
heating services..; The commission based its jurisdiction upon the some-
what flimsy pretext that the cdmpany which operated a generating plant,
also served a few places with eectricity at retail; and concluded therefore
that both corporations were engaged in the same kind of service within the
meaning of the statute.3'
A series of cases interpretihg a rather unusual provision of the con-
stitution of Pennsylvania, are interesting on this question of jurisdiction
over merger and consolidati6n. The Pennsylvania constitution specifically
prohibits one telegraph company from consolidating with or holding a con-
trolling interest in the stocks or bonds of any other telegraph company
owning a competing line.36 At first it was held that this prohibition applied
to telephone companies:also, because the legislature up to the date of the
decision had treated telephone companies as a species of telegraph com-
pany.37 In 1919, however, the legislature passed an" act allowing telephone
companies to acquire capital stock, franchises, and property including lines
and systems of other telephone companies with the consent of the commis-
sion. This legislation was upheld.3S. The Act of 1919 indicated that the
legislature had recognized a difference between telephone and telegraph
companies. Later, the legislature went even further and pefmitted, with
the consent of the commission, the acquisition by telephone companies of
'Re Continental Gas & Elec. Corporation, et al., P. U. R. Ig26D 71I (Neb.).
3IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 12768.
-"Re Central Indiana Power Co. et aL, P. U. R. i93oD 65 (Ind.).
'Re Public Service Co. of Indiana and Indiana Elet. Corp., P. U. R. I932B 534 (Ind.).
PA. CoNsr., art. XVI § Iz.
Cochranton Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 263 Pa. 5o6, 107 At]. 23
(igig), aff'g 7o Pa. Sup. 212 (1918) and P. U. R. i92oC:825 (Pa.).
'Shaffer v. Public Service Commission, 268 Pa. 456, 111 Atl. 877 (I919), upholding
the validity of Act "of July 22, I919, P. L. ii23.
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the property franchises and capital stock of telegraph companies, and vice
versa. This latter act was held valid also, as it did not come within the
prohibitions of the constitution against unification of telegraph companies.39
Grounds for Approving or Rejecting Applications
Occasionally courts and commissions have attempted to give a detailed
enumeration of what must be proved before consent will be given to a pro-
posed combination. A good enumeration is that of the Illinois commission
which has said that before approval will be given to an agreement to pur-
chase and sell it must be proved that such arrangement does not violate
any rule of law; that the price which is to be paid approximates the true
value; and that public convenience will be served thereby.4" Under the
Maine law the important considerations for approval of consolidation have
been declared to be these: the legal right of the purchaser to acquire and
hold property, effect on rates, petitioner's capacity to serve its present ter-
ritory, diminution of costs of management and operation, and petitioner's
capacity to meet obligations to existing security holders.
41
In a few states, the provisions of the public utility statutes expressly
declare that the commission shall approve if the proposal is for the benefit
of the public. Sometimes in lieu of the expression, "for the benefit of the
public", the terms, "the public good", or "will serve the convenience and
necessity of the public" are used.42 In such states it is obvious that a mere
finding that the public will be uninjured by the proposed transactions will
not satisfy the statutory requirements.
43
In most states, however, the statutes merely give to the commission
the power to approve or reject an application, and do not specify the grounds
upon which such decision must be based.44  Where the statutes do not men-
tion that approval shall be based upon a finding of public benefit or good,
difficulty has arisen over whether such finding is necessary, or whether it is
sufficient to find merely that a proposed transaction will not be injurious
" Mitchell v. Public Service Commission, 276 Pa. 39o, 12o Atl. 447 (1923), upholding
the validity of the Act of May 20, 1921, P. L. 949.
"0Re Chicago Tunnel Co., P. U. R. I9-6E 268 (Ill.).
"Re Bethel Light Co., P. U. R. I928B 512 (Me.); Re Buckfield Water, Power and
Electric Light Co., P. U. R. 1928C 306 (Me.); Re Ashland Elec. Light & Power Co., P.
U. R. 1929B 326 (Me.).
'See for example Pa. Act of July 26, 1913, P. L. 1374, art. V, § I8, and Act of July
26, 1913, P. L. 1388, art. III, § 3.
See also N. H. PuB. LAWS, c. 240, § 28; VT. GEN. LAWS (1917) § 4982.
"2Re Pennsylvania Water Service Co., P. U. R. I927E 656 (Pa.) ; see Grafton County
Elec. Light & Power Co. v. State, 77 N. H. 490, 93 Atl.. 1O28 (1915). See also Re Frank-
lin Light & Power Co., P. U. R. I929D 678 (N. H.). Although in this last case a state-
ment by the commission, that "Utilities should not be deprived from doing as they see fit
with their properties provided their acts are not illegal or harmful to the public", scarcely
seems in harmony with the express statutory requirement.
"See for example, the statutes of New York, Maryland, Indiana, Illinois, Maine and
Missouri supra note 12.
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to the public. In Maryland, the courts have ruled that a finding that a
proposed merger is not detrimental to the public is all which is required;
and that the commission has no power under the statutory provisions to
refuse an application because it finds that the public will not benefit.4 5 Com-
missions in some other states have, from time to time, enunciated this same
rule.4" On the other hand, the New York commission has emphatically
declared that it will not permit consolidation unless it is affirmatively shown
that it will be in the public interest, and has embodied this doctfine in its
."Rules of Practice". 47  Commissions in some other states have followed
the lead of the New York commission.4" It is difficult to choose between
the two rules onl the basis of judicial logic. Which one is followed depends
largely upon whether one regards utilities as enterprises primarily operated
in the interests of the public, and from which private profits may be made;
or whether one regards them as private enterprises with which the public
has no right to interfere except to demand reasonable service at reasonable
rates. Here is an opportunity for commissions to perform *an important
service to the public. To require that utilities shall make an affirmative
showing that their plan will serve the interests of the public does not impose
on them any hardship and it serves to strengthen the doctrine that they are
primarily public enterprises from which a profit can be made.
Many of the things which commissions regard as tending ter show that
the public will be benefited are obvious. To show that service will be im-
proved is important in establishing that the proposed union will benefit the
public. 49 And soa transfer was approved when a company, instead of
abandoning service which was being offered at a'loss,* was seeking to re-
organize and continue operation:50 A merger -iesulting in the unification
'Electric Pub. Uitil. Co. v. Public Service Cdmmission, 154 Md. 445, I4o Atl. 84o
(i928). The case was remanded to the commission which found that the proposed consoli-
dation was "detrimental to the public interest". Re-Electric Public Utilities Co., P. U. R.
I931A 557 (Md.).
" The Missouri commission appears to have frequently enunciated and followed this
doctrine, in spite of Rule XVI of the commiision which requires 'an applicant to show
that the proposed sale, lease, etc., is for the benefit of the public. See Re North Central
Tel. Co., P. U. R. I929B 604 (Mo.); Re Kansas City Telephone Co., P. U. R. i927C
ioI (Mo.); Re Liberal Light and Power Co., P. U.- R. 19 30t 282 (Mo.); Re Allegheny
Corp., P. U. R.' 193oD 47 (Mo.).
" Re Consolidated Gas Co. of New York, P. U. R. i928E i9 (N. Y.); Re Genesee
Valley Gas Co. Inc., P. U. R. 1927B 6oo (N. Y.) ; Re New York Power and Light Corp.,
P. U. R. 1928E 781 (N. Y.).
See Rule XI, Rules of Practice of the Public Service Commission of New York.
"' See the discussion of the Maine Commission in Re Eastport Water Co., P. U. R.
1929E 136 (Me.).
See Rule V, Rules of Procedure of the Railroad Commission of California; also Re
East Bay Water Co., P. U. R. i929A 62o (Cal.).
Apparently the Indiana Commission follows this rule. See Re Associated Telephone
Co., P. U. R. 1927C 577 (Ind.); Re Associated Telephone Co, P. U. R. i928B 83o (Ind.);
Re Central Indiana Power Co., supra note 34.
. Re Citizens Light & Power Co. and Millersburg Electric Light Co., P. U. R. 1gi5A
510 (Qhio); Re Watts Engineering Co., P. U. R. I923E 459 (Mo.); Re Raymond & Webb
Mills Tel. Co., P. U. R. i9x6F 749 (Me.).
R, Richmond Light & Railroad Co., 1923E 803 (N. Y.).
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of two street railway systems, was approved because it extended the transfer
privileges of patrons. 5 ' An acquisition of stock was approved in a case
where the commission thought that the public would receive a better quality
of service from the mixing of natural and artificial gas.5 2 The transfer
of a narrow gauge railroad was approved where it was shown that the
transfer eliminated needless duplication of facilities in a sparsely settled
community, and the standard gauge road with its transcontinental connec-
tions could serve the patrons more effectively.53 A sale of telephone prop-
erty was approved where it would result in rendering more stations available
to subscribers.5 4 It was held that the elimination of duplication with re-
sultant benefits to the public, justified commission approval of a telephone
unification.5 5 Commissions have sometimes approved applications where
the corporations would be placed in a more favorable financial situation, or
would be able to borrow money more readily, upon the assumption that this
would ultimately improve the facilities and service to the public."' In other
cases, commissions in granting petitions have looked forward to possible
reductions in rates which can be effected by eliminating duplication.'-
Sometimes commissions approve a lease, a sale, a merger, a consolida-
tion or a stock transfer because of probable benefits to stockholders and
corporations rather than to the public. In one early Maine decision, the
commission authorized a lease where there would be some increase in con-
venience and economy of operation; where the lessee guaranteed a 7 per cent.
return to the lessor's stockholders who had never before received a dividend;
and where the lessee would give as good service as the lessor-s Likewise,
in an early Indiana case, the commission gave as a reason for approving a
merger, that needless duplication of books, officers, and reports would be
abolished. 5 0
The commissions of some states have not looked with favor upon the
unification of widely scattered utilities. Thus, a petition to consolidate
fifteen widely scattered water companies was refused by the Maine com-
mission where there was no evidence that the service would be improved
"Re Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., P. U. R. i928B 345 (Wis.).
' Rc Columbia Gas and Eec. Corp., P. U. R. i93oB 472 (N. Y.).
"'Re Nevada-California-Oregon Ry., P. U. R. 1917E 404 (Cal.).
Re Philbrick, P. U. R. 1917C 874 (Me.) ; Re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., P. U. R. 1926C
I (Ill.).
'Re Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co., P. U. R. i923C 815 (Minn.); Re Union Home Tel. &
Tel. Corp., P. U. R. i9i8E 6o8 (Cal.) ; Re Application of Murphysboro Tel. Co., P. U.
R. I915B 955 (Ill.).
'Re Kansas City Telephone Co., supra note 46; Re Maryland Light & Power Co.,
P. U. R. 193oB 464 (Md.) ; Re Turners Falls Power & Elec. Co., P. U. R. 1915B 6i
(Mass.) ; Re Consolidated Gas Co. of N. Y., supra note 47; Re Sacramento Northern
Railroad, P. U. R. 1922B 6go (Cal.); Re Continental Gas & Elec. Co., P. U. R. 1925A
448 (Neb.).
'Re Continental Gas & Elec. Corporation, supra note 56; Re Consolidated Gas Co. of
N. Y., supra note 47; Re Continental Gas and Corp., supra note 32; Re Tintern Manor
Water Co., P. U. R. i926D 717 (N. J.); Re Illinois Bell Tel. Co., supra note 54.
-"Re Kittery Elec. Light Co., P. U. R. I917A 12 (Me.).
'Re Indianapolis Tel. Co., P. U. R. 1916D 5o7 (Ind.).
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or rates reduced as the result of quantity purchasing, giving of expert
engineering advice, or better facilities for financing. 60 This decision has
been followed by commissions of other states. 6 ' 'The Maryland commis-
sion, however, in refusing to permit unification of scattered electric utilities
found itself reversed by the courts.62 The public benefits to be derived
from combination of widely scattered utilities are shadowy at best, but this
is particularly the case with regard to water utilities. As one commission
has stated:
"Water service is not comparable at all with electric service, in that the
source of water supply rpust be reasonably close at hand and serves a local
use, while electric current can be exchanged freely over long distances,
supplying communities far distant from the power plant." 13
The question of whether it is for the public good or in the public in-
terest to allow a transfer: of property or stock to, or a consolidation or
merger with a foreign corporation has been passed upon by commissions
with varying results. The Vermont commission has declared that unless
there. are some marked benefits to be derived from such a transfer, it is
better not to allow it, in view of the limited jurisdiction of the commission
over the rates and capitalization of such companies. 6 4 The California corn-
mission has declared that it cannot authorize the transfer of any public
utility property to a foreign holding company. 5 The New York commis-
sion has permitted transfers to foreign companies but has scrutinized them
more carefully than transfers to domestic utilities or companies, and has
required more of a showing that public benefits will result. G  The Illinois
statutes contain a provision forbidding the grant or transfer to a foreign
corporation of a franchise, license, permit, Or right to own, control, or
operate any Illinois utility. This provision has been rendered largely in-
effective by a ruling of the courts that it does not apply to the purchase of
stocks and bonds by a foreign corporation. 7 The transfer of property
from a foreign corporation to a state-wide utility, has been held to be in the
'Re Eastport Gas Co., supra note 48.
"Re Pennsylvania Water Service Co., supra note 43; Re Interstate Utilities Co., P.
U. R. I922C 589 (Mich.); Re Genesee Valley Gas Co.. supra note 47.
'Re Electric Public Utilities Co., P. U. R. i927E 6og (Md.) reversed and remanded
in Electric Pub. Util. Co. v, Public Service Commissi6n, supra note 45.
' Re Eastport Gas Co., "supra note 48.
dRe Chester Water & Light Co., P. U. R. I929B 316 (Vt.) ; Re Public Utilities Con-
solidated Corp., P. U. R. i929B 492 (Vt.).
'Re Hollister Water Co., P. U. R. i93oA 525 (Cal.).
'Re Power & Eldc. Securities Corporation, P. U. R. i926A 855 (N. Y.) ; Re Morgan
and Wymon Elec. Light & Power Co., P. U. R. i925D 323 (N. Y.); Re Ridgefield Elec.
Co., P. U. R. 1925D 317 (N. Y.).
The New York Commission disapproved the sale oi the controlling stock of a domes-
tic utility t6 a foreign holding company largely because of the loss of jurisdiction to super-
vise intercompany relations. Re Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., P. U. R. 1931C 247 (N. Y.).
I State Public Utilities Comm. v. Romberg, supra note 3.
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interest of the public, as the transferee is entirely subject to the regulatory
power of the commission. '
The reasons given by commissions for refusing to allow consolidation,
merger, sale or stock transactions are varied. In one case, a petition for
consolidation was refused, in part because of a blanket mortgage which
was to be placed upon fifteen widely scattered utilities. As this might have
hampered and embarrassed the utilities in times of financial stress, it was
held not to be in accord with public interest.69 In another case, a commis-
sion refused an application of a gas company to purchase the property of
an electric company even though economies might have resulted because
under the laws of Massachusetts a municipality could not acquire gas and
electric utilities owned by a single corporation. Therefore, to have placed
such a barrier in the way of possible municipal acquisition was regarded
as contrary to public interest.7 0 The Indiana commission refused a peti-
tion for approval of the sale to a large company of telephone property and
other assets of several local exchanges where the local utilities had been
operating at a profit, and the large system had suffered a deficit at higher
rates than those charged by the local utilities and where such ecolnomies
as were claimed would be offset by a supervisory charge under an operating
contract which would have applied immediately, and which would have re-
quired the payment of 4Y2 per cent. of the gross receipts of subsidiaries to a
parent corporation. 7 ' In another case, because of the high prices and values
which prevailed at the time the commission considered that the consolida-
tion of utilities and a transfer of their property would not have been in the
interest of the public.12  An application to sell and purchase the capital
and assets of a telephone utility was refused, partly because certain laws
pertaining to intercorporate relationships had been violated, in spirit if not
in letter; and partly because a division of stock had been made in an
arbitrary fashion for the convenience of the owners only and without con-
sideration for the public.7 3 In California, a request to transfer property
from one utility to another was denied because of the precarious financial
condition of the purchaser."4 The North Dakota Commission turned down
an application to transfer an electric plant because the owner had an ap-
parent desire to continue operation but had made an agreement to sell
through fear of competition, and because the community preferred the
local owner."5 In a Pennsylvania case, the commission refused permission
'Rc New York Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1927E 732 (N. J.).
'ORe Eastport Gas Co., supra note 48.
"R, Cambridge Gas Light Co., P. U. R. I93oD 263 (Mass.).
"'Rc Citizens Telephone Co. of Columbus, P. U. R. I924E 835 (Ind.).
'Re Dakota Light, Heat & Power Co., P. U. R. I92oA 884 (N. D.).
'Re Northwestern Ind. Telephone Co., P. U. R. 1928B 717 (Ind.).
'Re Washington Water & Light Co., P. U. R. 193oB 249 (Cal.).
'Re Erickson. P. U. R. i927C 861 (N. D.). This was done in spite of the probability
that service would be just as good or better if the transfer were approved.
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to transfer certain real and personal property where the transferees had no
funds or resources with which to operate a utility plant, and the transferors
were real estate operators who wished to escape responsibility."6 In another
Pennsylvania case the applicants were denied permission to consolidate and
merge because their statements were too vague and indefinite as to the
proposed methods of financing, marketing electricity, and developing water
power." Finally, a gigantic merger of utilities was rejected by the Indiana
.commission because earnings would not have been sufficient to meet fixed
charges, there' was no adequate allowance for depreciation, and the only
possible advantage, the continued operation of certain interurban lines, was
doubtful.
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Numerous objections have been raised but have been regarded by com-
missions as insufficient grounds upon which to base a refusal to permit
merger, consolidation, lease, sale or stock transfer.70
Valuation
Many questions pertaining to the valuation of public utiiities for pur-
poses of consolidation, merger, sale, or stock transactions have arisen. In
a few states a valuation is required.8 0 As a rule, commissions are not re-
quired by statute to make an appraisal. They often do so, however, and
their findings may have some bearing upon rejection or approval. The
California court has stated that there is nothing in the statutory provisions
of that state which requires a valuation; but there is nothing to prevent the
regulatory authorities from making a valuation; and that it is entirely
within the discretion of the commission to decide whether or not it is neces-
"0Re Fuller, P. U. R. I92oC 138 (Pa.).
7Re Lawrence Hydro-Electric Co., P. U. R. I927C 78 (Pa.).
Re Central Indiana Power Co., supra note 34.
The following reasons were not regarded by Commissions as sufficient grounds for
refusing a permit to lease, sell, or consolidate properties or stock:
The mere size of a utility nor possibility that rates might be increased, as it must be
assumed that a proper supervision of rates would exist, Re Continental Gas & Elec. Corp.,
supra note 32.
Because a municipality might wish to acquire the utility at some later date, as the
commission felt that this could be done in spite of merger, Re Tintern Manor Water Works
Co., supra note 57. Re General Water Works & Elec. Corp., P. U. R. i93oA 354 (Ala.).
Because the lessee might make improvident extensions, Re Kittery Electric Light Co.,
supra note 58.
Because a municipal plant was ready and willing to serve in the territory, Re Los An-
geles Water Service Co., P. U. R. I927A 532 (Cal.).
Because plant would not be locally owned, Re Cumberland County Power & Light
Co., supra note 17.
Because a minority objected in the absence of fraud, Re United Light & Power Co.,
P. U. R. 1915C 807 (Cal.). In the case of Re Sacramento Northern Railroad Co., supra
note 56, the commission even went so far as to say that it would not refuse because stock-
holders intervened alleging fraud; and declared that it was interested in two things only,
public interest and excessive price, and that fraud was a question for the courts.
Io See IND. ANN. STAT. (Burns, 1926) § 12768, which requires the commission to deter-
mine the value of the stock of stockholders who dissent from the agreement to merge or
consolidate.
See also Wis. STAT. (1929) § i96.8o.
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sary.sl The Maine commission has declared that it does not have to deter-
mine what property may be capitalized where the petition does not involve
either the fixing of rates or issuing securities. s-  Under the Illinois statutes,
the commission has held that when the proposed capitalization of con-
solidated companies does not exceed the sum of the capital stock of con-
stituent companies, the commission is not required to determine the value
of the properties of utilities.s 3
Granted that a commission is required or finds it desirable to make a
valuation, does it include the same items or use the same basis which it
employs in determining the value of utilities for rate-making purposes?
Some commissions have stated that there are differcnces.84  The North
Dakota commission declared that the valuation for purposes of purchase
and sale permits additional items not included in the valuation for rate-
making.5 The Indiana commission declared that although the valuation
should be made in the same way as if it were being done for rate-making
purposes, such value might not necessarily be used as a basis for fixing
rates."' Although commissions have asserted that such differences exist,
they have never enumerated in detail or specified exactly what they are.
As a general rule, commissions use the cost of reproduction less de-
preciation as the basis of valuation. 7  Sometimes earning power has been
given some weight. ss Other bases which have been mentioned occasionally
are original cost and sale value. This latter appears to be based upon the
possibilities for future development by way of new uses and new customers
for the services of a utility8s The California commission has consistently
refused to use the cost of reproduction as a basis for valuation in cases of
sale of utilities, and has declared that the proper basis is historical cost less
depreciation."
'Baldwin v. Railroad Comm., 206 Cal. 581, 275 Pac. 425 (929).
'Re Pennamaquan Power Co., P. U. R. 1927E 147 (Me.).
'Re Illinois Northern Utilities Co., P. U. R. 1917A 816 (I1.).
" Re Southern Ill. Light & Power Co., P. U. R. I919D 489 (Ill.); Re Stark County
Power Co., P. U. R. I9i8A 224 (Il.-). "In the fixing of a value for rate-making purposes
the public is directly and vitally concerned that this value shall rest upon the firm basis of
property value .. .. However, in a case of purchase and sale the public is not vitally
interested, except to make certain that the property is not so crippled by indebtedness and
fixed charges that its operation is precarious. The parties who are principally concerned
are the purchaser and the seller."
Re Tyrone Electric Co., P. U. R. I916E 7o8 at 711 (Ill.). "Regulatory bodies, in gen-
eral, have recognized a broad distinction between capitalizing intangibles in security-issue
cases and in rate cases."
' Re Dakota Light Heat and Power Co., spra note 72.
" Re Princeton Telephone Co., P. U. R. I923A 620 (Ind.).
'rRe Akron Tel. Co., P. U. R. 1927A 67 (Ind.) ; see the statement of the commission
in Re North Central Telephone Co., supra note 46; Re City of Chippewa Falls, P. U. R.
1927A 545 (Wis.).
'Re Public Service Co., P. U. R. i927A 67 (MO.).
'Electric Public Utilities Co. v. Public Service Comm., P. U. R. I928E 854 (Md.).
t 'Re Pacific Gas & Electric Co., P. U. R. 1923C 535 (Cal.); Re California Water
Service Co., P. U. R. 1928D 2o8 (Cal.); Re Russian River Water Co., P. U. R. I929A 39
(Cal.); Re Cady Bros., P. U. R. 1929A 15 (Cal.).
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A few words should be said concerning special items which commis-
sions allow or do not allow in ascertaining the value of utilities. In the
first place, the California commission refused to permit any value for a
franchise where there was no evidence that any 'sum had been spent to
obtain it.' This, of course, is the general rule followed by commissions
in ascertaining value for rate purposes. However, an allowance for a
fi-anchise in making a valuation for merger, consolidation or sale might
be justified where no such item could fairly be permitted in ascertaining
the value for rate purposes. It is obviously unfair to charge the public for
something which it has granted to a private corporation, whereas it may
not be unfair to require the buyer to pay for a franchise; provided the cost
thereof does not ultimately fall on the public.
As a rule, a sum for going value seems to be allowed by commissions. "
A few exceptions to this rule can be found. The Wisconsin commission
refused to allow a specific amount for going value, alleging that it had given
due consideration to this factor in its finding of the total value of the enter-
prise. 93 Likewise, the California commission refused to allow any sum for
so-called going value.
9 4
A sum for working capital is usually permitted, just as it is in ascer-
taining a value for rate-making purposes.5 It is easy to see how even a
greater allowance for such an item can justifiably be made in merger cases
than in rate cases. It is obviously unfair to fix rates so as to force con-
sumers to pay for unusually large reserve stocks of working capital; whereas
there seems to be no injustice in permitting a purchaser to pay for large
stocks of working capital, on the theory that such materials may gradually
be consumed in the future.
A commission allowed $500,000 for an artificial gas plant which was
usable but not used, even though the commission admitted that such an
item ought not to be allowed in a valuation for rate-making purposes. The
reason for this difference is obvious. It is unfair to force the public to pay
rates on a large piece of property which is unused for producing service,
but it is not unjust to allow a seller to charge a purchaser for property which
obviously has considerable value."
In a valuation for capitalization purposes, a commission refused to
permit an item for increased efficiency and decreased operating costs which
nRe Star & Crescent Boat Co., P. U. R. i925E 581 (Cat).
'Re Associated Telephone Co., P. U. R. I927C 577 (Ind.); Re Kansas City Gas Co.,
P. U. R. 192CC 41 (Mo.); Re Central Maine Power Co., P. U. R. 1922C 36 (Me.).
13Re City of Chippewa Falls, supra note 87.
'Re Hollister Water Co., supra note 65.
5Re Central Maine Power Co., P. U. R. 1918C 792 (Me.); Re City of Chippewa
Falls, supra note 93; Re Jersey Central Power & Light Co., P. U. R. I925D 6g9 (N. J.).
"'Re Kansas City Gas Co., supra note 92.
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might have resulted from a consolidation, on the grounds that such things




In one case, a commission made an addition of 15 per cent. to a value
which it had found. This addition was to cover engineering superintend-
ence, fire and liability insurance and contingencies during construction."8
In cases of merger, consolidation, sale or stock transfer, commissions
are frequently confronted with excessive valuations which in turn may be
reflected in the price or the capitalization. The question naturally arises
as to how commissions deal with such situations. There are three possible
ways of handling the problem. The commission may refuse to allow the
application on the grounds that it is not in the interests of the public; or
the commission may fix a valuation and grant the application on condition
that the price or capitalization is based upon its valuation; or the commis-
sion may allow the sale, merger or stock transaction but reqtiire that the
difference between a fair value and the excessive value be amortized.
As a general rule, commissions have not regarded excessive price or
valuation unaccompanied by other objectionable features as sufficient
grounds for denying a petition. Apparently, they take the attitude that
the price or valuation should be set by the management and should not be
arbitrarily interfered with by regulatory authority.9" One Maryland court
declared that such interference is scarcely warranted where the commission
,has complete control over rates and service, as the possibility of injury to
the public can be guarded against in other ways. 100 The likelihood of a
refusal is remote, where the applicants are not seeking to issue securities
in connection with purchase, but are expecting to pay the price in cash
from their own coffers.
10'
Occasionally, commissions have not allowed a consolidation where the
utility might have been obliged to assume an insurmountable financial bur-
den, or where the price was grossly in excess of a fair value. 10 2 The reason
for refusal in such cases is obvious. If a company has to assume a gigantic
financial burden, it will undoubtedly be reflected either in rates or service
to the public.'0 3
'" Re Dakota Light, Heat & Power Co., supra note 72.
' Re Princeton Tel. Co., supra note 86.
'Re North Missouri Power Co., P. U. R. I924C 853 (Mo.); Re Mountain Grove
Creamery Ice & Elec. Co., P. U. R. I926B 346 (Mo.) ; Re Missouri General Utilities Co.,
P. U. R. 1926C 393 (Mo.).
'l' Electric Public Utilities Co. v. Public Service Comm., supra note 89.
'Re Hooksett Aqueduct Co., P. U. R. 1918C 389 (N. H.); Re Bradford Light &
Power Co., P. U. R. 1923D 622 (N. H.).
o_-New York Power & Light Corp., supra note 49, where it appeared that a price of
$282,000 was to be paid for property valued at $58,ooo; Re Penn Public Service Corp., P.
U. R. I926B 791 (Pa.) ; Re Southern Ill. Light & Power Co., supra note 84; Re Genesee
Valley Gas Co., Inc., supra note 47; Re Metropolitan Edison Co., P. U. R., 1927E 639
(Pa.) ; Re Riley, P. U. R. I923C 302 (Cal.) ; Re California Water Service Co., supra note
go; Re Cady Brothers, supra note go; Re Niagara Hudson Power Corp., P. U. R. I93iB
343 (N. Y.).
' Re -North Central Telephone Co., supra note 46.
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When commissions allow a petitioner to consolidate even though the
valuation is excessive, they usually attach conditions which are designed
to guard against the possibility of the public being compelled to assume
the burden of the excessive valuation. It is common, for example, to
grant the application but require that the excess shall not be charged to
property accounts or capitalization, or come out of operating expenses, but
shall be amortized out of net income available for contingencies, dividends
or surplus.104  Sometimes commissions have insisted that the excess be
charged to profit and loss.' 0 5 In one case, the board of public utility com-
missioners required that the difference between what it had found to be
fair value and that which had been fixed by the utility engineers, should be
transferred from a surplus account to an amortization reserve account.' 0 6
Often commissions have required that a company shall not use the value
fixed for consolidation or sale purposes as a basis for rates to be charged
to the public.' 0 ,
The third alternative, fixing a price or valuation instead of refusing
the application altogether or allowing it on condition that the excess be
amortized, is possible but seldom used.108  In fact, commissions have some-
times declared that it was doubtful whether they had jurisdiction to fix
prices. 109
Conditions
It is customary for commissions to attach certain conditions to order
granting permission to sell, merge, consolidate or acquire stock. The
statutes in many states specifically give to commissions this authority.
110
There appear to be few limits on the nature of these conditions except that
they must not be arbitrary or unreasonable. There is much variation in
the nature of these conditions. Among the most common are those which
require the amortization of excessive prices.
"'Re Illinois Power & Light Corp., P. U. R. I928A 776 (Ill.); Re San Diego Consol.
Gas & Elec. Co., P. U. R. I9I7E 409 (Cal.); Re Forgan, P. U. R. I9i8C 803 (Ill.); Re
Watts Engineering Co., supra note 49; Re Union Elec. Light & Power Co., P. U. R. I924A
74 (Mo.); Re Stark County Power Co., supra note 84; Re Tyrone Elec. Co., Mpra note 84;
Re North Missouri Power Co., supra note 99; Re Davis Junction Elec. Co., P. U. R. I93oA
468 (Ill.); Re Hollister, supra note 65.
See Re Nevada Cal. & Ore. Tel. and Tel. Co., P. U. R. 1929D 43 (Cal.); Re South
Coast Gas Co., P. U. R. I929E 476 (Cal.); Re Forgan, supra note 1o4; Re Tyrone Elec.
Co., supra note 84; Re Tuolumne County Elec. Power & Light Co., P. U. R. i928C 31
(Cal.).
X°ORe Atlantic City Elec. Co., 1, U. R. I925A 352 (N. 3.).
Re Standard Consolidated Mining Co., P. U. R. I9I5B 23 (Cal.); Re Willis, P. U.
R. I9t5B 24 (Cal.) ; Re Missouri General Utilities Co.. supra note 99; Re Missouri Stand-
ard Tel. Co., P. U. R. i928C 695 (Mo); Re Empire Telephone Co., P. U. R. Ig2oB 664
(Cal.).
See Re Richland Realty Co., P. U. R. I915C 847 (Cal.).
'=Re South Coast Gas Co., supra note io5; Re Power & Elec. Secwities Corp., mspra
note 66. In this last case the commission stated that it had no power to fix prices except
as an incident to denying or granting applications, the limit of the discretion is whether the
public interest will be harmed or served by granting the application.
See for example Ill. Laws 1921, 703, art. I, § 27.
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In searching the cases, one finds little uniformity as to the kind of
conditions attached to orders approving applications to merge, consolidate,
or to sell or acquire stock. 1 ' Some of them seem to be attached for the
benefit of stockholders, others for protection of the public. Commissions
have sometimes used their authority to attach conditions, as means of regu-
lating utilities in a manner which would be impossible under their other
powers.
The Effect of Mergers, Sales and Stock Acquisitions Undertaken Without
the Consent of Commissions
If the statutes require that the commission must approve consolidations,
mergers, sales or stock acquisitions, such transactions consummated without
'aRe Northwestern Redwood Co., P. U. R. 1923C 741 (Cal.), application to transfer
utility granted subject to a condition that certain records and books which showed costs
of properties and results of operation should be transferred.
Re Valley Home Tel. Co., P. U. R. 1915A 55 (Mich.), a consolidation was approved
upon condition that a certain connection between consolidated exchanges and another com-
pany be restored.
Re Fresno Farms Co., P. U. R. I915B 324 (Cal.), an application to sell a water system
was granted on condition that the land company would guarantee the water company against
loss and allow the water company to use certain ditches.
Re Northwestern Telephone Exchange Co., P. U. R. i916D 534 (Minn.), an applica-
tion to purchase majority stock was approved upon condition that the right of subscribers
of the vendor to certain toll connections with another company should not be impaired and
on condition that stock of minority be purchased upon same terms as proposed for purchase
of majority stock.
Re Maryland Power & Light Co., et al., supra note 56, application to consolidate granted
on condition that the consolidated company keep separate accounts for each community so
that the commission could determine whether any community was bearing an undue share
of the burden of rates.
Re Santa Paula Home Tel. Co., P. U. R. i9i6E 259 (Cal.), an application of tele-
phone companies for approval of sale or exchange was granted upon condition that certain
rates be equalized for all subscribers of both companies.
Re San Gabriel Valley Water Co., P. U. R. i917A 655 (Cal.), an application to sell
a water plant and system was approved on condition that the purchaser which was a city
would stipulate to continue service to consumers outside the city.
Re Riverside Home Tel. & Tel. Co., P. U. R. t9i7B 1085 (Cal.), a consolidation of
lines of telephone companies authorized on condition that subscribers of both companies
would receive either manual or automatic service according to preference of customer.
Re Fresno Canal & Land Co., P. U. R. 1917D 271 (Cal.), the purchaser was required
to stipulate that it would undertake all the liabilities and obligations resting upon the vendor.
Re Southern Cal. Tel. Co., P. U. R. I917A 989 (Cal.), an application for the pur-
chase of property and the consolidation of telephone properties was granted on condition
that the consolidated company would not apply for an increase in rates for 5 years, would
give to each subscriber a choice of automatic or manual service, would give to each sub-
scriber a choice of telephone toll service rendered by two companies, would not change the
principal office from the city where located at the time of the approval, would not claim
any franchise value in excess of moneys paid therefor, and would keep certain accounts.
Re Great Lakes Utilities Corporation, P. U. R. I927E 409 (N. Y.), a petition for con-
sent to acquire stock of a gas utility was granted on condition that the petitioner's offer of
,$7o a share be extended to all of the stockholders of the corporation, and that the order
should not be construed as a determination of the value of the property.
Re Bethel Light Co., supra note 41, a petition to consolidate was approved on condi-
tion that the company take proper corporate action to bind itself to assume the duties to-
ward the public of the four companies which were being consolidated.
Re -ihn, P. U. R. 191713 lO84 (Cal.), the order authorized the transfer to the city
of a water system on condition that the city file a stipulation that it was willing to serve
certain consumers outside the city limits.
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commission consent are void.-1 2 The statutes of most states so provide.
So strictly do certain commissions adhere to this rule that they will not
ratify sales made without their consent."13 Where there is no way in which
they can validate an unauthorized transaction, they require parties to ex-
ecute a new instrument and make a new application."14 There may be ex-
tenuating circumstances which justify a departure from the general rule.
For example, in one case, the California Commission, even though its con-
sent had not been obtained, recognized the title in a transferee, where the
transfer had been made in good faith and without intention of violating
the law, and the whereabouts of the transferor were unknown so that he
could not participate in an application." 5  Nor will the courts allow the
general rule to be used as a cloak to cover fraud or grave injustice." 0
Conclusion
As previously stated, the records studied indicate that consolidations,
mergers, sales or stock acquisitions have, as a rule, been attained by utilities
without great difficulty. That many such unifications have been beneficial
to the public cannot be denied. The great pity is that they have not been
more beneficial. Had government authorities been more alert, this would
have been possible without doing injury to the legitimate interests of
utilities.
In part the difficulties have been due to lack of authority by agents
responsible for administering regulatory statutes. Not more than half the
states have conferred upon their utility commissions express authority to
control unifications. Even in those states which have made efforts to con-
trol such proceedings, legislatures have usually failed to extend control to
cover the most common and important method of unification, that through
holding companies. Thus important and gigantic combinations have been
built up almost entirely without state control.
Any scheme for controlling combinations should confer upon public
service commissions as complete jurisdiction as possible; that is, should
give them authority to control consolidations, mergers, leases, sales of
franchises or property, stock acquisitions by operating companies, holding
companies, or other companies. Persons desiring to bring about unifica-
tion should be compelled to make a definite showing that the proposed ar-
'Re 11Valapai, P. U. R. 19I7D 271 (Ariz.); Napa Valley Elec. Co. v. Callistoga Elec.
Co., 38 Cal. App. 477, 176 Pac. 699 (1918) ; Re Otter Tail Power & Light Co., supra note
2; Re Purchase & Farmers Co-Operative Milling Co., supra note 23.
raRe Olive Investment Co., P. U. R. 1924E 554 (Cal.) Contra: see statement of the
New York commission in Re Cayuga Power Co., P. U. R. i9t7E 915 (N. Y.).
"Re Delta Warehouse Co., P. U. R. I93oA 255 (Cal.).
"*Re Smith, P. U. R. I923A i24 (Cal.).
"'Otter Tail Power Co. v. Clark, 59 N. D. 320, 229 N. W. 915 (1930).
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rangement will be beneficial to the public. It would probably not be amiss
to require a valuation, and give to commissions the power to fix a price or
valuation at which a transfer may take place. If regulatory authorities
had had such powers during the past ten years, and if they had diligently
exercised them, utilities would not have been permitted when transferring
their property or stock to make the extraordinary writeups in their valua-
tions which have in so many cases proved detrimental not only to consumers
but also to investors.
